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Rhesusmonkeys have been shown to prefer risky over safe options in experiential decision-
making tasks. These ﬁndings might be due, however, to speciﬁc contextual factors, such
as small amounts of ﬂuid reward and minimal costs for risk-taking.To better understand the
factors affecting decision-making under risk in rhesus monkeys, we tested multiple factors
designed to increase the stakes including larger reward amounts, distinct food items rather
than ﬂuid reward, a smaller number of trials per session, and risky options with greater
variation that also included non-rewarded outcomes. We found a consistent preference
for risky options, except when the expected value of the safe option was greater than
the risky option. Thus, with equivalent mean utilities between the safe and risky options,
rhesus monkeys appear to have a robust preference for the risky options in a broad range
of circumstances, akin to the preferences found in human children and some adults in
similar tasks. One account for this result is that monkeys make their choices based on
the salience of the largest payoff, without integrating likelihood and value across trials. A
related idea is that they fail to override an impulsive tendency to select the option with
the potential to obtain the highest possible outcome. Our results rule out strict versions of
both accounts and contribute to an understanding of the diversity of risky decision-making
among primates.
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INTRODUCTION
Our lives are ﬁlled with choices, and many choice options involve
an element of uncertainty or risk. In principle, people should
prefer options with the highest expected value, but in practice, dif-
ferent choices often prevail. Expressed in economic terms, people
do not consistentlymaximize utility. The reason appears to involve
the difﬁculty in computing utility, especially in natural conditions,
when options are many and the outcomes uncertain or risky. We
focus here on risky options, and we broadly deﬁne an option’s
risk level as the variation in its potential reward outcomes (Weber
et al., 2004; McCoy and Platt, 2005; Hayden et al., 2008). Thus, an
optionwithmore than one potential outcome is risky and contains
inherent opportunity costs based on the missed opportunities of
the unchosen options.
Consider the calculations required to compare a safe option
to a risky one. A safe option could involve receiving $1 for every
choice. A risky option with the same average value could involve
receiving $2, but only for half of the choices, with the other half
yielding nothing. The expected utility of the risky option is a
function of the potential outcome values and their likelihoods:
($2 × 0.5) + ($0 × 0.5) = $1. It is easy to see how such calcu-
lations could become computationally demanding with, for e.g.,
multiple choice options, each with multiple possible outcomes
with different likelihoods.
Because of this computational complexity, our decision-
making mechanisms have evolved to manage it using heuristics
that substitute computationally difﬁcult calculations with approx-
imations (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, 1981; Kahneman et al.,
1982; Kahneman and Frederick, 2002; Chen et al., 2006; Kahne-
man, 2011; Lakshminarayanan et al., 2011; Kralik et al., 2012). To
understand howwemake decisions, therefore, it is not sufﬁcient to
evaluate precise outcomes; wemust alsounderstand theoperations
of the cognitive processes underlying these heuristics.
In general, people are risk averse and avoid options that may
result in a perceived loss of a“lesser”gain, no gain at all, or an actual
loss. In addition,when outcome values and likelihoods are difﬁcult
to integrate, people tend to focus on speciﬁc components, such as
the potential perceived losses or missed opportunities (opportu-
nity costs), while ignoring others, such as likelihoods. Because
of such factors, how problems are posed affects decision-making
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, 1981; Kahneman and Tversky,
1984; Kahneman, 2011). For example, people’s preferences are
inﬂuenced by whether the outcome contingencies are presented
to them in oral or written form, as opposed to those discerned
through experience. Choices are also affected by the number of
decisions to be made, such as one opportunity to gamble vs. mul-
tiple opportunities (Montgomery and Adelbratt, 1982; Klos, 2005;
Sundali and Croson, 2006; Rabin and Vayanos, 2010; Kahneman,
2011). In one-shot gambles, people appear to be particularly averse
to the potential perceived loss and thus tend to select the safer
option. With repeated gambles, people take on more risk, believ-
ing that the potential for possible perceived loss is mitigated as
actual outcomes converge to the expected utilities (which reﬂects
another bias, known as the Samuelson fallacy; Samuelson, 1963;
Montgomery andAdelbratt, 1982; Klos, 2005; Sundali andCroson,
2006; Rabin and Vayanos, 2010; Kahneman, 2011).
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Here we focus on experiential problems (as opposed to oral
or written ones), which characterizes many problems faced by
humans and all of those faced by other animals. Such problems
are less susceptible to certain biases, but can still be difﬁcult to
evaluate. We also take a comparative perspective, which can pro-
vide some insight into the evolutionary history of decision-making
processes and can also clarify possible advantages conferred by
different types of risk and value assessments under different
environmental conditions, independent of language-related and
sociocultural factors. We use “risk preference” or “risk-seeking”
for a preference for risky over safe options, and “risk aversion” or
“safety preference” for vice versa.
There is evidence for a risk preference in rhesus monkeys
(Macaca mulatta), a representative catarrhine monkey and a
descendant of the last common ancestor of Old World monkeys,
apes, and humans. For choices between options of equal overall
expected utility, rhesusmonkeys have been shown to have a prefer-
ence for risky options (McCoy and Platt, 2005; Hayden and Platt,
2007; Hayden et al., 2008; O’Neill and Schultz, 2010). For example,
they preferred a risky option with a 50/50 chance of either 250 or
50microliters of fruit juice to a safe option that offered 150micro-
liters 100% of the time. Recently, however, the generality of this
conclusion has been questioned. Heilbronner and Hayden (2013)
suggested that the risk preference of rhesusmonkeysmight be con-
text dependent, resulting from speciﬁc task parameters that might
promote risk-seeking. These parameters include small differences
in ﬂuid reward, repeated gambles across hundreds, if not thou-
sands, of trials, and short intertrial intervals (ITI) of a few seconds
or less. In fact, a recent study found rhesus monkeys to be mildy
risk averse (i.e., the percent of risky choices was less than 50%, i.e.,
risk neutrality, but not signiﬁcantly so; Yamada et al., 2013). In this
study, rhesusmonkeys chose between a certain option that paid off
a ﬁxed amount of juice 100% of the time versus a risky option that
paid off a particular amount 50% of the time, and nothing 50%
of the time. Four conditions were used in which the amount of
the safe option was changed. Within each condition ﬁve different
risky options were used, each of different amounts, and thus the
expected utility varied among these ﬁve risky options. In only the
middle risky option in each condition were the expected utilities
of the safe and risky options equal.
It remains unclear exactly why the risk preferences were differ-
ent in this study versus the others that found a risky preference.
Possible explanations include (1) higher amounts of juice used;
(2) non-rewarded trials on 50% of risky choices; (3) signiﬁcant
experience with a ﬁxed probability structure for the risky options
and multiple different values that could have trained the monkeys
to use both probability and value and thus expected utility; and (4)
pie charts displayed at the beginning of the trial to represent value
thatmay have helped simplify (e.g., linearize) the value estimation.
To help delineate the key factors, we modiﬁed several of them
while maintaining equal expected utilities in Experiments 1–6 as
in the original studies. After ﬁrst determining the relative value
of three qualitatively different food items, we conducted seven
short experiments using them as reward. Compared to the pre-
vious studies, we increased the stakes by using fewer trials per
session, a longer intertrial interval, larger reward amounts, and
greater variation in the risky outcomes. In addition, rather than
ﬂuid reward, our study used food items. The risky options also
includednon-rewarded outcomes (Yamada et al., 2013). In the ﬁrst
six experiments, the monkeys preferred the risky option. Finally,
we tested whether their risk preference was due to a focus on the
highest outcome payoff of the risky option (a salience bias), with
neglect of likelihoods. Both monkeys exhibited sensitivity to the
likelihoods, reversing their preferences to the safe option when it
paid off four times more than the risky one.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
SUBJECTS
Twomale rhesus monkeys were available for this study, denoted as
Monkey T and P, ages 11 and 9, respectively. Animal care and use
compliedwith all current laws, regulations, policies, and guidelines
of the United States, the United States Department of Agricul-
ture (USDA), the Public Health Service (PHS), and all procedures
were approved by the Institutional Animal Care and Use Commit-
tee (IACUC) of Dartmouth College. The Center for Comparative
Medicine and Research (CCMR) at Dartmouth maintains a full-
time animal care and veterinary staff that monitors the monkeys’
daily health and well-being.
The monkeys were housed in a homeroom with automatically
regulated temperature, ventilation, humidity, and lighting. The
monkeys were intermittently housed together and individually: at
times when they engaged in confrontations, which is normal peri-
odic behavior in young rhesus macaque males of similar size and
temperament (Thierry et al., 2004), the two monkeys were sepa-
rated and individually housed for their safety. When pair-housed,
they had direct physical contact with each other, and when indi-
vidually housed, through a mesh grading divider between their
cages. They also had direct visual contact with the other monkeys
in the colony, as well as the animal care staff and experimenters. In
addition, environmental enrichment included twoormore enrich-
ment items in their home cages at all times, daily playing of radio
or videos in the room (the latter via a monitor mounted in view
of all individuals), and regular access to a larger enrichment cage
(172.7 cm × 96.5 cm × 182.9 cm) in an adjacent room. The
monkeys had ad libitum access to food and water during the study.
MATERIALS AND TESTING PROCEDURES
In the test room, the monkey’s chair was placed on the opposite
side of a table, 76.2 cm, from the experimenter. A monkey sat in
the chair, with his left arm loosely restrained (using two custom-
made metal rings attached to the chair around both the upper and
lower arms) and the right arm free to reach.
In food preference testing, the monkeys were presented with
two rectangular compartments (each 7.62 cm × 8.89 cm), which
had transparent lids in order to see the food items directly. In
Experiments 1–7, which tested risk preferences, the monkeys
were presented with one or two opaque compartments, also
7.62 cm × 8.89 cm, which might or might not contain food items.
For these seven experiments, the left compartment lid was blue
with a green center cross, and the right compartment lid was green
with a blue center cross (see Figure 1).
Each compartment was glued to its own underlying Plexiglas®
sheet (12.7 cm × 35.56 cm) with the compartment at the
monkey’s end of the sheet. The compartments could thus be
Frontiers in Psychology | Decision Neuroscience April 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 258 | 2
Xu and Kralik Rhesus monkey risk preference
FIGURE 1 |Task design schematic of Experiments 1–7. Each block consisted of four forced choice trials on each side (order randomly determined) followed by
eight free choice trials. For each trial, the Plexiglas apparatus was presented to the monkey out of reaching distance before it was moved forward for selection.
moved both simultaneously (with the sheets touching on adjacent
edges) and independently. An opaque plastic divider separated the
experimenter and the monkey. An opening at the bottom of the
divider allowed the experimenter to present both compartments
simultaneously by placing each hand on the back of a Plexiglas
sheet and sliding the compartments toward themonkey. Themon-
keys made selections by lifting a compartment lid to obtain the
contents inside.
To minimize the potential for inadvertent cues from the
experimenter, several procedures were implemented: (a) as just
mentioned, an opaque plastic divider separated the experimenter
and the monkey, thus preventing the monkey from seeing the face
and upper body of the experimenter; (b) white noise was played to
minimize auditory distractions; and (c) the experimenter followed
a well-practiced routine on each trial.
For all testing in the study (food preference tests and exper-
iments), each trial began with the experimenter holding the
Plexiglas apparatus so that both compartments were 40.6 cm in
front of the monkey but not within the monkey’s reach. The
experimenter held this position until the monkey looked at the
compartments, as determined by monitoring the monkey via a
close-circuit camera and videomonitor. Next, both compartments
were pushed forward to a ﬁxed positionwithin themonkey’s reach.
Once the monkey touched the lid of one of the compartments,
the unselected compartment was quickly removed. The intertrial
interval throughout the study was approximately 15 s.
To rule out potential side biasing effects in food preference
testing, the food item positions (left or right compartment) were
randomized within a daily session, with the constraint that each
food item was presented to the left and right an equal number of
times in the session. For each monkey, 60 trials were conducted
per daily session, and two sessions were conducted for each of the
three food preference testing conditions.
For risk preference testing (Experiments 1–7), we conducted
the trials in blocks, with each block consisting of 16 trials: eight
forced choice trials – four forced choice trials from one of the two
compartments (randomly determined) followed by four forced
choices from the other compartment – and eight free choice trials
(Figure 1). Themonkeys typically performed four blocks per daily
session with 12 blocks per experiment (further detail below). The
Table 1 |The reward contingencies in the seven experiments (A: mini
M&M, B: mini marshmallow, and C: cheerio).
Experiment Safe option Risky option
Contingencies CV Utility
1 1B (100%) 2B (50%) and 0 (50%) 1 1B
2 1A (100%) 2A (50%) and 0 (50%) 1 1A
3 1A (100%) 4A (25%) and 0 (75%) 2.2 1A
4 1A (100%) 2A (50%) and 0 (50%) 1 1A
5 1A (100%) 8A (12.5%) and 0 (87.5%) 5 1A
6 1C (100%) 2C (50%) and 0 (50%) 1 1C
7 1A (100%) 2A (12.5%) and 0 (87.5%) 5 0.25A
CV: coefﬁcient of variation of the risky option; Utility: the expected mean value
of the risky option by objective calculations.
experiments were conducted in consecutive order and only one
experimentwas conducted in anydaily session (thus, on sessions in
which an experiment was completed, the session terminated, and
the new experiment was begun the following session). The exper-
iment the monkey experienced in each daily session was not cued;
rather, we used the forced choice trials conducted at the begin-
ning of every block as the means by which the monkeys learned
the contingencies of the given experiment. Table 1 summarizes the
outcome contingencies for both the risky and safe options for each
experiment, along with (a) the coefﬁcient of variation (CV) as a
measure of the level of risk, i.e., the standard deviation divided by
themean, and (b) the objective utility, i.e., the sum of the products
of value by likelihood for all option outcomes, of the risky options.
To minimize the potential for the actual experienced payoffs
associated with the risky option deviating signiﬁcantly from the
assigned contingencies, the outcomes of the risky options were
set up in the following way. We ﬁrst describe the free choice tri-
als. In all experiments, the outcomes associated with the risky
option occurred according to the assigned proportions across each
block of eight consecutive free choice trials. Thus, for exam-
ple, in Experiment 1 four of the eight free choice trials were
pseudo-randomly assigned to pay off two mini marshmallows;
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and thus every free choice block of eight trials paid off exactly as
listed in Table 1. We next describe the forced choice trials. For
all experiments except for 5 and 7, the outcomes associated with
the risky option occurred according to the assigned proportions
across each block of four consecutive forced choice trials. Thus,
for example, in Experiment 1 two of the four forced choice trials
were pseudo-randomly assigned to pay off two mini marshmal-
lows. For Experiments 5 and 7, the outcomes associated with the
risky option occurred according to the assigned proportions across
every two blocks, and thus across every eight forced choice trials.
Thus, for example, in Experiment 5 one of the eight forced choice
trials across every two blocks (i.e., four in the ﬁrst block, four
in the second) was pseudo-randomly assigned to pay off eight
mini M&Ms. As reported in the section Potential response strate-
gies, we found no evidence that the monkeys were sensitive to the
local changes in the trial-by-trial outcome probabilities due to this
baiting procedure.
To rule out the potential inﬂuence of location biases, each
experiment was conducted in two conﬁgurations in which the
safe and risky option switched compartment positions. The com-
partments retained their same color and shape features, and thus
the monkeys had to discern the ﬂipped contingencies based on
the forced choice trials. In Experiment 1, Monkey P was run on
11 blocks in one conﬁguration and 10 blocks in the other, while
Monkey Twas run on eight blocks in each conﬁguration. In Exper-
iment 2, Monkey P was run on eight blocks in one conﬁguration
and six blocks in the other, while Monkey T was run on 12 blocks
in one conﬁguration and 11 blocks in the other. In Experiments 3–
7, both monkeys were run on 12 blocks in each conﬁguration. To
obtain the monkeys’ stable choice preference in each experiment,
we analyzed the last 30 free choice trials in both conﬁgurations
combined, i.e., 60 total trials per experiment. All binomial tests
were two-tailed.
RESULTS
In a series of experiments in which the mean utilities between the
safe and risky options were equivalent, we manipulated the value
of the gamble via changes in reward quality (Experiments 1, 2, 4,
6), the risk level via changes in the CV (Experiments 2–5), and
novelty (Experiment 4 replicating Experiment 2). Despite these
changes, both monkeys continued to prefer the risky over the safe
option. Only when the utility associated with the safe option was
greater than that for the risky option did the monkeys prefer the
safe option (Experiment 7).
FOOD PREFERENCE
We ﬁrst conducted food preferences to assess the relative value of
food items that differed in quality.We tested three food items using
a two alternative free choice procedure: a mini M&M® (food A), a
mini marshmallow (food B), and a cheerio® (food C). The mon-
keys were familiar with these food items, but only received them
during the study in the food preference tests and experiments.
Food preference results
For mini M&Ms (A) vs. cheerios (C), both monkeys exhibited a
signiﬁcant preference for the former (Monkey P, 99.2%, binomial
test, z =10.68,p<0.001;MonkeyT,90.8%,binomial test, z =8.85,
p < 0.001). They also exhibited a signiﬁcant preference for mini
M&Ms (A) over mini marshmallows (B) (Monkey P, 64.2%, bino-
mial test, z = 3.01, p < 0.01; Monkey T, 73.3%, binomial test,
z = 5.02, p< 0.001) and for mini marshmallows (B) over cheerios
(C) (Monkey P, 90.8%, binomial test, z = 8.85, p < 0.01; Monkey
T, 80.0%, binomial test, z = 6.48, p < 0.001).
Food preference discussion
Overall, both monkeys exhibited a clear transitive preference
among the three food items (A>B>C). They valuedminiM&Ms
the most, mini marshmallows second, and cheerios least. Neither
the food’s mass, caloric value, nor sugar content fully accounted
for these preferences. One mini M&M had a mass of 0.30 g (0.19 g
sugar) and 1.47 cal; one mini marshmallow had 0.50 g (0.28 g
sugar) and 1.67 cal; and one cheerio had 0.10 g (0.03 g sugar) and
0.39 cal. So the preferred subjective values did not fall in the same
order as the objective values, although cheerios came out last in
both. In terms of size (volume), the preferred food, mini M&Ms,
was the smallest of the three foods. Thus, although mini marsh-
mallows were the largest, heaviest, most caloric, and contained
the most sugar, the monkeys preferred the mini M&Ms, perhaps
because of its chocolate content or its higher sugar density [mini
M&Ms (A): 1.06g/mm3; mini marshmallows (B): 0.56g/mm3;
cheerios (C): 0.33g/mm3]. Finally, the food preference results also
show that even though the monkeys were not food restricted, they
were sufﬁciently motivated to select and consume the items, and
they held clear preferences among the items.
EXPERIMENT 1
All trials consisted of a safe option in one compartment and a risky
option in the other. The safe option always contained one mini
marshmallow, while the risky option yielded two mini marshmal-
lows 50% of the time and nothing 50% of the time. The mean
utility of both options was 1 mini marshmallow.
Experiment 1 results
Both monkeys exhibited a signiﬁcant preference for the risky
option over the safe option (Figure 2). Monkey P selected the
risky option at an 86.7% rate (binomial test, z = 5.55, p < 0.001)
and Monkey T did so at an 83.3% rate (binomial test, z = 5.03,
p < 0.001).
Experiment 1 discussion
Both monkeys preferred the risky option over the safe one when
foraging for mini marshmallows, the intermediately valued food
item. McCoy and Platt (2005) found a risk preference using time
access to ﬂuid rewards as their measure, and our results generalize
this ﬁnding to discrete food quantities. Experiment 1 also differs
fromprevious ones in that ourmonkeys exhibited a risk preference
with relatively few trials and a longer ITI (McCoy and Platt, 2005;
Hayden and Platt, 2007; Hayden et al., 2008; O’Neill and Schultz,
2010), thus further generalizing the ﬁnding.
We can only infer the subjective value of food items, although
the monkeys appear to place a high value on the marshmallows.
We cannot rule out the possibility that their motivation was insuf-
ﬁcient to be affected by the “0” trials of the risky option, i.e.,
the trials on which the monkeys obtained no marshmallows. In
Experiment 2, we used mini M&Ms, a more valued food item, to
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FIGURE 2 | Experiment 1–7:The mean percentage of trials each monkey selected the risky option over the last 30 free choice trials in both
configurations (60 total trials). Dashed line: no preference; Asterisks: signiﬁcant preference (two-tailed binomial test, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001).
determine if increasing the intrinsic reward value would change
the monkeys’ risk preference.
EXPERIMENT 2
Subjects, Materials, and Methodology were the same as in Experi-
ment 1 except for the food used: mini M&Ms.
Experiment 2 results
As Figure 2 shows, both monkeys exhibited a signiﬁcant prefer-
ence for the risky over the safe option. Monkey P and T selected
the risky option 86.7% (binomial test, z = 5.55, p < 0.001)
and 70.0% (binomial test, z = 2.97, p < 0.01) of the time,
respectively.
Experiment 2 discussion
The more valuable food item, mini M&M (A), did not alter the
monkeys’ general risk preference as compared to mini marsh-
mallow (B), the intermediately valued food item used in Experi-
ment 1. Thus, the intrinsic reward value difference between these
two food items did not have a signiﬁcant effect on the mon-
keys’ general risk preference. We test reward quality again in
Experiment 6.
EXPERIMENT 3
In McCoy and Platt’s (2005) study, the monkeys’ risk preference
increasedwithCVwhen it was progressively increased from0.0667
to 0.667. In our Experiments 1 and 2, the CV for the risky option
was 1. It is unclear whether risky behavior would continue when
the risky option’s CV becomes >1. In addition, the likelihoods
of the outcomes in the risky options used in previous monkey
studies (McCoy and Platt, 2005; Hayden and Platt, 2007; Hayden
et al., 2008; O’Neill and Schultz, 2010) have been 50–50%. In such
cases, the high outcome has a relatively high possibility per trial.
In Experiment 3, we addressed these issues by increasing the risky
option’s CV above 1 and lowering the likelihood of the high reward
outcome.
Subjects, Materials, and General Methodology were the same
as in Experiment 1. All trials consisted of a safe option in one
compartment and a risky option in the other. The safe option
always contained one mini M&M, while the risky option yielded
four mini M&Ms 25% of the time and nothing the remainder of
the time (Table 1). Thus, the CV of the risky option was 2.2, and
the mean utility of both options was 1 mini M&M.
Experiment 3 results
Bothmonkeys continued to exhibit a signiﬁcant preference for the
risky option over the safe option, and did so to a greater extent
than in Experiments 1 and 2 (Figure 2). Speciﬁcally, Monkey P
and T selected the risky option 100% (binomial test, z = 7.62,
p < 0.001) and 96.7% (binomial test, z = 7.1, p < 0.01) of the
time, respectively.
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Experiment 3 discussion
Both monkeys strongly preferred the risky option over the safe
option with the new experimental contingencies. Hence, the risk
preference persisted despite increasing the CV of the risky option
from 1 to 2.2, reducing the likelihood of the highest outcome from
50% to 25%, and increasing the highest outcome from two discrete
miniM&Ms to four. The results suggest that themonkeysmight be
more attentive to the large reward outcome and/or the outcome’s
CV, although further testing is needed to assess the generality of
this conclusion.
EXPERIMENT 4
The risk preference observed in Experiment 3 might have been
due to the novelty of the risky option’s new reward contingency
compared to Experiment 2 (with the safe option remaining the
same, but the risky option contingency changing). We do not
believe this to be the case for two reasons: (1) our analysis used
the last 30 trials in each conﬁguration after sufﬁcient learning
and a stable preference was obtained; and (2) in Experiments 1
and 2 both the safe and risky option contingencies were novel,
and yet the monkeys exhibited preferences for the risky option.
However, we nonetheless addressed this issue in Experiment 4 by
repeating Experiment 2 to test whether the risky option’s novelty
in Experiment 3 compared to Experiment 2 led to the risky choice
preference in Experiment 3. Furthermore, to standardize the block
sizes across conﬁgurations and subsequent experiments, we set
the block size at 12 per conﬁguration beginning in Experiment
3. We therefore also repeated Experiment 2 to test the contingen-
cies under the standardized protocol to enable direct comparisons
across experiments (see Effects of contingency parameters).
The methods for Experiment 4 were the same as described in
Experiment 2.
Experiment 4 results
Both monkeys exhibited a signiﬁcant preference for the risky
option, as they had in Experiment 2 (Figure 2), at a rate of 100%
for Monkey P (binomial test, z = 7.62, p < 0.001) and 93.3% for
Monkey T (binomial test, z = 6.58, p < 0.001).
Experiment 4 discussion
Both monkeys continued to prefer the risky over the safe option.
Thus, the risk preference of the monkeys observed in Experiment
3 appeared to be a general preference rather than one based on the
novelty of the risky option’s contingency in Experiment 3 com-
pared to Experiment 2. In addition, we replicated the general risky
preference exhibited in Experiment 2.
EXPERIMENT 5
Because the monkeys’ risky option preferences did not seem to
be affected by the novelty of the risky option’s contingencies, we
explored more extreme parameters.
In Experiment 5, the safe option always contained one mini
M&M, while the risky option yielded eight mini M&Ms 12.5% of
the time and nothing the remainder of the time. Thus, the CV
of the risky option was 5, and the mean expected value of both
options was 1 mini M&M.
Experiment 5 results
As in the previous experiments, both monkeys exhibited a signiﬁ-
cant preference for the risky option over the safe option (Figure 2),
at a rate of 100% (binomial test, z = 7.62, p < 0.001) for Monkey
P and 93.3% (binomial test, z = 6.58, p < 0.001) for Monkey T,
much like Experiments 3 and 4.
Experiment 5 discussion
Despite the three changes from Experiment 3 – increasing the CV
of the risky option from 2.2 to 5, reducing the likelihood of the
risky option’s positive outcome from 25 to 12.5%; and increasing
the risky option’s positive reward outcome from four discretemini
M&Ms to eight – the monkeys reliably preferred the risky option.
This result also serves as a control for a CV of 5, which applies to
Experiment 7 as well. We take up this point later.
EXPERIMENT 6
An important issue is the extent decision-making preferences
change based on one’s intrinsic motivation level. In principle,
motivation relates to both the current state of the organism, i.e.,
their level of “wealth,” and the current state of the environment,
whether rich or lean. Results thus far are mixed, with individuals
appearing to become more and less risk-seeking with increasing
motivation in different studies (Caraco et al., 1980; Kacelnik and
Bateson, 1996, 1997; Abreu and Kacelnik, 1999; Yamada et al.,
2013). In Experiment 6 we tested whether a decrease in the moti-
vation level might result in a preference reversal to the safe option
by decreasing the intrinsic value of the food reward. To do so, we
repeated the outcome contingencies of Experiments 1, 2, and 4
but replaced the food items with cheerios, the least preferred food.
The safe option always contained one cheerio, while the risky
option yielded two cheerios 50% of the time and nothing 50% of
the time (Table 1).
Experiment 6 results
Monkey P and T selected the risky option 90% (binomial test,
z = 6.07, p< 0.001) and 88.3% (binomial test, z = 5.81, p< 0.001)
of the time, respectively (Figure 2).
Experiment 6 discussion
Both monkeys preferred the risky over the safe option using chee-
rios as reward. Thus, a change in reward quality did not change the
overall risk preferences of the monkeys, at least within the range
tested in our study. However, evidence was found for some effect
of intrinsic reward value (see Effects of contingency parameters).
EXPERIMENT 7
A possible account for the risk preference in Experiments 1–6 was
that the monkeys might be driven toward the option with the
highest possible reward outcome (a salience bias). Along with this
possibility, the monkeys might also be relatively insensitive to the
likelihood-based valuations of the options. This could be due to
the stakes inwhich there is noobjective loss other thanopportunity
costs.
To test these possibilities, in Experiment 7 the monkeys chose
between a safe and a risky option with the risky option having a
lower mean utility compared to the safe one. The risky option still
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had potential for the largest reward outcome in the experiment, as
in Experiments 1–6.
The safe option always contained one mini M&M, while the
risky option yielded twominiM&Ms 12.5% of the time and noth-
ing the remainder of the time. Thus, the CV of the risky option
was 5 (as in Experiment 5) and its mean expected utility was 0.25
mini M&Ms. As in Experiments 2–5, the mean expected utility of
the safe option was 1 mini M&M, four times larger than the risky
option in this experiment (Table 1).
Experiment 7 results
Unlike the results of Experiments 1–6, both monkeys exhibited
a signiﬁcant preference for the safe option over the risky one
(Figure 2). Speciﬁcally, Monkey P selected the risky option at
a rate of 8.3% (binomial test, z = −6.33, p < 0.001) and Monkey
T did so at 21.7% (binomial test, z = −4.26, p < 0.001).
Experiment 7 discussion
These results show that neither monkey simply chose the option
that yielded the most valuable possible outcome, which would
have reﬂected a salience bias. The results further show that both
monkeys integrated likelihood and the reward value across trials
to make their decisions.
COMPARISONS ACROSS EXPERIMENTS
Effects of contingency parameters
Because Experiments 1 and 2 were conducted with fewer than 12
blocks per condition, we compared the percent of risky choices in
Experiments 3–7. A comparison of Experiments 4 and 6 (Table 1)
showed that there was an effect of reward quality with the percent
risky choice decreasing with a decrease in reward quality in both
monkeys; however, the decrease was signiﬁcant only forMonkey P
[X2(1) = 6.316, p = 0.012; Monkey T, X2(1) = 0.901, p = 0.343].
Thus, to the extent overall reward quality inﬂuences motiva-
tion, there was some evidence for greater motivation leading to
increased risk-preferring behavior. A comparison of Experiments
3 and 4 [Monkey P,X2(1)= 0, p = 1; Monkey T,X2(1)= 0, p = 1],
Experiments 4 and 5 [Monkey P, X2(1) = 0, p = 1; Monkey T,
X2(1)= 0, p= 1], andExperiments 3 and 5 [MonkeyP, t(2)= 3.28,
p = 0.08; Monkey T, t(2) = 0.35, p = 0.76] found no relationship
between CV and the percent of risky choices for either monkey,
which could have been due to a ceiling effect. Finally, a comparison
of Experiments 4 and 7 showed that likelihood affected the per-
cent of risky choices in both monkeys [Monkey P,X2(1) = 127.03,
p < 0.001; Monkey T, X2(1) = 60.92, p < 0.001], and thus pref-
erences could not be explained by a neglect of the non-rewarded
outcomes of the risky options.
Potential response strategies
Although there was some evidence for persistence or response
habits when the conﬁgurations changed, nonetheless, in every
experiment, both monkeys changed their choice to the risky
(Experiments 1–6) or safe option (Experiment 7). Even so, strate-
gies such as “win-stay, lose-shift” or “win-shift, lose-stay” were
possible (Genovesio et al., 2005; Heilbronner and Hayden, 2013).
Due to our baited procedure for determining the outcomes of the
risky options (see MATERIALS AND TESTING PROCEDURES),
a “win-shift, lose-stay” strategy would be a sign that the monkeys
were tracking the changes in the trial-by-trial probabilities instead
of showing a true overall risk preference. However, we found
no evidence for this response strategy by either monkey in any
experiment. Furthermore, we found no evidence for the “win-
stay, lose-shift” response strategy in any experiment except for one
monkey in Experiment 7, when mean utilities between options
were unequal. In all other cases, comparing the proportion of tri-
als each monkey stayed with the risky option after receiving the
largest outcome with the proportion each monkey stayed with the
risky optionwhen he did not receive the largest outcome,we found
no signiﬁcant differences [Experiment 1: Monkey P,X2(1) = 0.15,
p = 0.70; Monkey T, X2(1) = 0.08, p = 0.77; Experiment 2: Mon-
key P, X2(1) = 0.02, p = 0.89; Monkey T, X2(1) = 3.04, p = 0.08;
Experiment 3: Monkey P, X2(1) = 0.09, p = 0.77; Monkey T,
X2(1) = 0.75, p = 0.39; Experiment 4: Monkey P, X2(1) = 1.94,
p = 0.16; Monkey T, X2(1) = 1.10, p = 0.29; Experiment 5: Mon-
key P, X2(1) = 0.54, p = 0.46; Monkey T, X2(1) = 3.04, p = 0.08;
Experiment 6: Monkey P, X2(1) = 0.41, p = 0.52; Monkey T,
X2(1) = 0.01, p = 0.91; Experiment 7: Monkey P, X2(1) = 1.24,
p = 0.276]. The exception was Monkey T in Experiment 7, in
which he appeared to exhibit a “win-stay, lose-shift” strategy with
the risky option (X2 = 4.22, p = 0.04). Thus, except for Monkey
T in Experiment 7, the response strategy that best reﬂected their
choice behavior was“win-stay, lose-stay,” suggesting that themon-
keys were exhibiting an overall risk preference for Experiments
1–6.
In Experiments 5 and 7, in the forced choice trials, the outcomes
associatedwith the risky option occurred according to the assigned
proportions across every two blocks, and thus across every eight
forced choice trials (i.e., four forced choice trials in one block,
and four in the second). This baiting procedure resulted in trial
blocks in which one of the risky forced choices was rewarded, fol-
lowed by a trial block in which none of the risky forced choices
were rewarded (or vice versa). If the monkeys were sensitive to the
local changes in the trial-by-trial outcome probabilities due to this
baiting procedure, there should be a difference in the percent of
risky choices in the blocks in which the large payoff was received
in the forced choice trials vs. when no reward was received in the
forced choice trials. To test for a potential pattern in Experiments
5 and 7, we examined the free choices in the last four blocks in each
left–right conﬁguration (eight blocks total).We compared the four
blocks in which one of the four risky forced choices was rewarded
to the four blocks in which none of the risky forced choices were
rewarded. Neither monkey showed a signiﬁcant behavioral dif-
ference between these blocks in either experiment [Experiment 5:
Monkey P, X2(1) = 0, p = 1; Monkey T, X2(1) = 0.35, p = 0.55;
Experiment 7: Monkey P, X2(1) = 0.22, p = 0.64; Monkey T,
X2(1) = 1.46, p = 0.23], and thus they appeared to be following
the general risky option contingency rather than local trial-by-trial
changes.
Dynamics across experiments
Table 2 shows the number of trials in which each monkey ﬁrst
exhibited his ﬁnal preference in each left–right conﬁguration
(examined with a sliding window of 16 free choice trials). For
example, in Experiment 1, Monkey P exhibited a signiﬁcant
risk preference after 75 free choice trials in his ﬁrst experienced
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Table 2 |The number of trials in which each monkey first showed his
final preference, with preference measured using a sliding window of
16 consecutive free choice trials, and a preference-significance
threshold of ≥13/16, (p < 0.05, two-tailed binomial test), assessed for
each configuration separately.
Experiment Monkey P MonkeyT
Conf. 1 Conf. 2 Total Conf. 1 Conf. 2 Total
1 75 66 141 63 22 85
2 48 27 75 64 84 148
3 42 43 85 20 71 91
4 44 25 69 56 67 123
5 21 31 52 33 40 73
6 28 37 65 77 35 112
7 69 78 147 78 31 109
Conf: conﬁguration.
conﬁguration, and then showed a signiﬁcant risk preference after
66 free choice trials when the safe and risky options changed posi-
tions. We found no signiﬁcant decrease (or increase) across all
experiments either overall or for either conﬁguration for either
monkey (linear regression using the values in each column of
Table 2, p > 0.05), suggesting that the monkeys were learning
each new contingency for each experiment.
Examining only the experiments with risk preferences, i.e.,
Experiments 1–6, neither monkey exhibited a signiﬁcant change
overall (linear regression, Monkey P: R2 = 0.63, p = 0.059; Mon-
key T: R2 = 0.13, p = 0.833), although Monkey P was trending
toward signiﬁcance (p = 0.059), which was due to a signiﬁcant
decrease for Conﬁguration 1 (R2 = 0.8, p < 0.05) but not Con-
ﬁguration 2 (R2 = 0.28, p = 0.28). In addition, given identical
reward contingencies in Experiments 2 and 4, a comparison of
the acquisition rates to acquire a signiﬁcant preference in the two
experiments enabled a direct test of experience on choice behav-
ior. The acquisition rates did not differ [Monkey P, t(2) = 0.21,
p = 0.85; Monkey T, t(2) = 1.10, p = 0.39], providing evidence
against an experiential effect across experiments. Finally, for both
monkeys, the total number of trials to achieve signiﬁcance in both
conﬁgurationswas the lowest (and thus the fastest acquisition rate)
for Experiment 5, in which they could obtain the largest amount
of the preferred food item on any risky trial – eight mini M&Ms –
12.5% of the time.
DISCUSSION
RISK PREFERENCE: EXPERIMENTS 1–6
The preferences for risky options reported thus far for macaque
monkeys are potentially context driven, resulting from speciﬁc
task parameters that might promote risk-seeking (Heilbronner
and Hayden, 2013). Previous studies that found a risk prefer-
ence in rhesus monkeys have used small reward amounts and
differences, repeated gambles across hundreds of trials, and short
intertrial intervals, all of whichmaypromote risk-seeking behavior
(Hayden and Platt, 2007, 2009; O’Neill and Schultz, 2010; Heil-
bronner andHayden, 2013). In contrast, a recent study foundmild
risk aversion in rhesus monkeys (Yamada et al., 2013). Compared
to the previous studies, this one had higher reward amounts,
non-rewarded trials,multiple comparisons with unequal expected
utilities, and visual cues (pie charts) to represent the available
reward amounts. It thus remains unclear what factors lead to risky
versus safe preferences in rhesusmonkeys. In Experiments 1–6, we
examined the effect of several factors while keeping the expected
utilities of the choice options equal (as they were in the original
studies that found preferences for the risky options). More specif-
ically, we examined the following: (1) to change reinforcer type as
well as to examine the effects of reward quality, we used food rather
than ﬂuid reward; (2) to increase the stakes with respect to the
variation in the risky options, we heightened the risk level beyond
those used in previous studies; (3) to increase the cost of risky
choices, we (a) used no reward outcomes (omission of reward),
and (b) reduced the likelihood of receiving the large reward out-
come associated with the risky option to below 50%; and (4) to
increase the signiﬁcance of individual choices, we used (a) a max-
imum of 32 daily free choice trials per monkey (as opposed to
hundreds of free choice trials), and (b) a longer intertrial inter-
val (15 s). Despite these modiﬁcations, both monkeys showed a
consistent preference for the risky option except when the mean
utility for the safe option was greater than for the risky option,
and in our case, fourfold greater. Future testing can systemati-
cally modify the mean utility between the safe and risky options to
determine the indifference (subjective equivalence) point of such
preferences.
Because ﬂuid rewards were previously used (McCoy and Platt,
2005; Hayden and Platt, 2007; Hayden et al., 2008; O’Neill and
Schultz, 2010), our results show that the monkeys’ risk preference
extends to food-based rewards as well. In addition, Hayden and
Platt (2007) found that the rhesus monkeys’ preference reached
neutrality as the intertrial interval increased to 90 s in their
gambling task. In our study, we used an intertrial interval of
15 s. However, because our risky option used reward omission
outcomes instead of small-reward outcomes, the monkeys expe-
rienced a further delay similar to an additional intertrial interval.
Because the large reward outcome had a lower likelihood (e.g.,
12.5% in Experiment 5 compared to 50% in the study of Hay-
den and Platt), the monkeys easily experienced many interreward
intervals>90 s; and yet they still maintained a risky preference.
One possible account for the risk preference of the monkeys
in our study was that the initial preference for the risky option
in Experiment 1 drew their preference toward the risky option
for the subsequent Experiments 2–6. It has been shown that
choices themselves can inﬂuence subsequent preferences (Mont-
gomery and Adelbratt, 1982; Klos, 2005; Sundali and Croson,
2006; Rabin and Vayanos, 2010; Kahneman, 2011), especially
when subjects must learn the outcome likelihoods (i.e., proba-
bilities) via experience over trials. Although interactions among
experiments could inﬂuence choices, we think that this factor was
minimal in our study. First, we reversed the left–right conﬁgu-
rations within each experiment while holding the visual stimulus
locations constant to mitigate against simple stimulus–response
associations driving choice. Thus themonkeys’preferences needed
to be based on the actual reinforcement contingency in each exper-
iment independent of visual stimuli and location. Second, to help
demarcate the change in the reinforcement contingencies across
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the experiments (and conﬁgurations within each experiment),
we used a forced and free choice block structure in which the
monkeys received four consecutive forced choice trials with each
option, followed by eight free choice trials. The forced choice
trials help provide clearer feedback with respect to the cur-
rent reinforcement contingencies. Third, if the monkeys were
continuing to use the same general likelihoods across experi-
ments, the monkeys should not have required so many trials to
develop a signiﬁcant preference in Experiments 2–6: an aver-
age of 35 (Monkey P) and 55 (Monkey T) per conﬁguration,
69 (Monkey P) and 109 (Monkey T) per experiment (Table 2);
and further, they should have exhibited a clear decrease in the
number of trials to attain a signiﬁcant preference across Exper-
iments 1–6, which they did not. Fourth, Experiment 4, which
replicated Experiment 2, provided a test for the effect of expe-
rience. The acquisition rates did not differ for either monkey.
Finally, the overall faster acquisition rate of both monkeys in
Experiment 5 (which had the largest payoff outcome of the more-
preferred food item), as well as the reversal of preference to the
safe option in Experiment 7, showed that the monkeys were
inﬂuenced by the actual reward contingencies of each experi-
ment. Thus, the continued risk preferences appeared to reﬂect
a preference for the given option under each of the experimental
contingencies.
Thus, the risk preference generalizes across multiple contexts.
Yet it remains unclear why a strong risk preference was found
here, whereas a mildy risk averse preference was found in the
Yamada et al. (2013) study. There appear to be three leading possi-
bilities. One, because we baited our risky trials (see MATERIALS
AND TESTING PROCEDURES), ensuring that the reward would
occur within a certain number of trials, it is possible that the
decreased variance affected decision-making by reducing the neg-
ative impact of the non-rewarded trials (although no direct impact
on behavioral strategies was observed). Second, experience with
ﬁxed probabilities andmultiple risky valuesmight help to train the
monkeys to respond tobothprobability and value and thus accord-
ing to expected utility. Finally, the use of pie charts to represent
the available reward amounts during decision-making might help
to clarify and simplify the reward estimation. It certainly should
help to minimize memory effects. Further work will be necessary
to determine the contributing factors.
Thus, taken together, contextual factors clearly inﬂuence
decision-making preferences (Heilbronner and Hayden, 2013).
Nonetheless, inherent preferences might still exist, leading to
species and individual differences. Such potential biases need to
be examined under minimal experience and with multiple mea-
sures including acquisition rates. It also will be critical to compare
groups in testing paradigms as identical as possible. To that end,
people were tested in a comparable paradigm to that used with
rhesus monkeys that obtained risk-seeking in the monkeys (Hay-
den and Platt, 2009). The human subjects appeared to be less
loss averse than in instructed tasks, with the majority of people
being risk-neutral (i.e., no signiﬁcant preference found between
safe and risky options). In fact, three general populations could be
identiﬁed: risk-averse, risk-neutral and risk-seeking. In addition,
in a similar paradigm, differences were found between human
children, adolescents, and young adults, with children showing
a preference for risky over safe options, adolescents showing a
mild risk preference, and young adults generally showing a pref-
erence for the safe option (Paulsen et al., 2011b, 2012). Thus,
human risk preferences cannot be simply explained by a gen-
eral context difference such as instruction- vs. experience-based
choices.
It is of interest that rhesus monkey risk preferences may resem-
ble those of some human children, adolescents, and adults, at least
to some degree (Hayden and Platt, 2009; Paulsen et al., 2011a,b,
2012). It is worth exploring whether this ﬁnding results from
similar relative differences in the balance of control of brain struc-
tures involved in higher-level integration of value across trials vs.
those driving impulsive responses (McClure et al., 2004; Delgado
et al., 2008; Hare et al., 2009; Hassin et al., 2010; Kober et al., 2010;
Volkow, 2010; Volkow et al., 2010; Berkman et al., 2011; Goldstein
and Volkow, 2011; Heatherton and Wagner, 2011). A preference
for risky options in some non-human animals, human children,
adolescents, and some human adults could reﬂect relatively weak
executive control.
More speciﬁcally, general risk preferences such as what we
observed in Experiments 1–6 could be due to value estimation
that is non-linear. That is, the actual value added per reward item
might increasewith an increasingnumber of items. In otherwords,
two M&Ms might have more than twice the value of one M&M.
Some evidence suggests that rhesusmonkeys are signiﬁcantlymore
sensitive to changes in high-reward outcomes compared to low-
reward outcomes (Hayden et al., 2008). Our results agree. The
fastest acquisition rate occurred in Experiment 5, in which the
monkeys could obtain the largest amount of the preferred food
item in any experiment – eight mini M&Ms – even though it was
only received 12.5% of the time. Similarly, risk preferences could
reﬂect an insensitivity to the lower-valued risky outcome, espe-
cially when the value of the outcome is lower than the potential
“jackpot,” but nonetheless positive or 0, as opposed to a negative
value associated with an aversive outcome. Risk preferences could
also reﬂect a relative insensitivity to the likelihoods, and in con-
sequence, to the risk being taken (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979;
Kahneman,2011). Finally, risky choice behavior could also reﬂect a
preference for outcome stochasticity (Hayden et al., 2008). Future
work will be needed to tease apart the potential inﬂuences on
risky behavior such as a ﬁxation on the highest outcomes, a rela-
tive insensitivity to non-rewarded or low cost outcomes, a relative
neglect of likelihood, a preference for outcome stochasticity, and
other factors.
As opposed to risk preferences reﬂecting poor behavioral con-
trol, another possibility is that a preference for risk evolved as an
adaptation for exploratory behavior in foraging or social behav-
ior. Risk preference and impulsiveness in rhesus monkeys could
reﬂect ancestral conditions that selected for such behavior, such
as an omnivorous diet that might provide a selective advantage
for the seeking of new outcomes of foraging choices or the height-
ened conspeciﬁc competition in a rigidly hierarchical social system
(Thierry et al., 2004; Evans and Beran, 2007; Wise, 2008; Kralik
et al., 2012; Passingham and Wise, 2012).
At the same time, there is certainly diversity and individual vari-
ability in non-human primates and people, and selection forces
sculpting decision-making strategies may have led to multiple
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response “niches,” with relatively bolder and more prudent indi-
viduals both ﬁnding success. Indeed, even our two monkeys
exhibited differences in their choice behavior: e.g., the effect of
reward quality, and the use of response strategies in Experiment 7.
Nonetheless, general species differences are also possible. Because
our two subjects revealed the same general preferences in all seven
experiments and because our results match other studies show-
ing risk preferences in rhesus monkeys (McCoy and Platt, 2005;
Hayden et al., 2008), our ﬁndings might represent rhesus mon-
key preferences in general, at least under our task parameters.
Future work with more subjects will be necessary to determine
species-level risky preferences and to further characterize the cir-
cumstances they may manifest. A two-subject study does however
reveal a capacity within the species among at least a subpopulation
of individuals, especially when corroborated by other published
ﬁndings.
Finally, we found some evidence for the inﬂuence of reward
quality on preference: risk preferences decreased with the decrease
in reward quality in Experiment 6 versus 4 (signiﬁcantly so for
monkey P). A heightened general reward level in the environment
can increase the motivational level of the individual, leading to
increased response vigor (Niv et al., 2007). This ﬁnding corrobo-
rates those that have found increasing risk-seeking with increasing
motivation, such as hunger, but contrasts with other ﬁndings
(Caraco et al., 1980; Kacelnik and Bateson, 1996, 1997; Abreu and
Kacelnik, 1999; Yamada et al., 2013). To be sure, more work is nec-
essary to clarify the effects of related variables such as motivation,
“wealth,” and general environmental conditions on risk behavior.
SAFETY PREFERENCE: EXPERIMENT 7
Despite the risk preference shown in Experiments 1–6 and in pub-
lished work (McCoy and Platt, 2005; Hayden et al., 2008; O’Neill
and Schultz, 2010), the results in Experiment 7 showed that the
risk preference could be overcome, and that it was not simply due
to factors such as the neglect of likelihood or the insensitivity to
trials with no reward. Ultimately, bothmonkeys demonstrated the
capacity to integrate likelihood and value across trials to obtain
an expected utility for the risky option, which was lower than the
safe option in Experiment 7. The incentive required to induce
monkeys to shift from risky to safe options needs further study,
especially since our two monkeys appeared to use different strate-
gies. Monkey T used a win-stay, lose-shift strategy, but Monkey
P did not. In any case, Experiment 7 shows that rhesus monkeys
have the capacity to override any impulsive tendency to select the
option with the highest possible outcome under our experimental
conditions, as was found in the Yamada et al. (2013) study.
CONCLUSION
Affective decision-making is a fundamental cognitive process, with
multiple phenotypic variations in people (Heino et al., 1996; Kah-
neman and Tversky, 2000; Weber et al., 2002; Schuck-Paim et al.,
2004; Soane and Chmiel, 2005; Paulsen et al., 2011b; Weller and
Tikir, 2011), and with signiﬁcant personal, societal, and clinical
ramiﬁcations when risk-seeking becomes excessive (Rasmussen
and Eisen, 1992; Davis et al., 2004; Fishbein et al., 2005; Kreek
et al., 2005; Admon et al., 2012). An evolutionary and compar-
ative analysis should help delineate the nature of its underlying
component processes and the conditions under which different
phenotypes are manifested.
In the present study, we found that rhesus monkeys prefer
risky to safe options in many circumstances, at least when the
expected value of the safe and risky options are equivalent. How
this risky preference interacts with utility maximization is yet to
be determined. Rhesus monkeys are descendants of the last com-
mon ancestor (LCA) of Old World monkeys, apes, and humans.
Assuming that their capabilities resemble the LCA, at least more
closely than modern humans do, this catarrhine species’ abili-
ties may reﬂect the evolution of cognition in our lineage at a
time when both a lower-level impulsive process and a higher-level,
more integrative process existed, with perhaps a bias toward the
former. Given that a general dual-process architecture is hypoth-
esized to underlie human cognition (Bechara, 2005; Kahneman,
2011; Dolan and Dayan, 2013; Evans and Stanovich, 2013), behav-
ioral and neurophysiological studies with rhesus monkeys should
help characterize the dynamics of the underlying cognitive pro-
cesses, as well as provide insight into the evolutionary history of
decision-making in a risky and uncertain world.
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